N55 Walking house

November 1, 2008 by

 If you haven’t run across N55, they are an odd somewhat-anarchistic art collective based in Denmark.  Among other things, they work on small DIY floating structures like MICROISLAND, FLOATING PLATFORM, MODULAR BOAT, and SMALL FISHFARM.  Their most recent project is a walking house.  While not the most efficient way to implement dynamic geography, it has (like most of their projects) a certain artistic flair:

 

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Housing busts, household mobility, and seasteading

October 15, 2008 by

From Calculated Risk:

Less worker mobility [due to negative equity] is kind of like arteriosclerosis of the economy. It lowers the overall growth potential.

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Competitive Government vs. Democratic Government

September 8, 2008 by

 Arnold Kling has a paper (PDF) which is directly relevant to the political motivation for seasteading:

In this essay, I will suggest that competitive government might be better than democratic government at satisfying the desires of the governed. In democratic government, people take jurisdictions as given, and they elect leaders. In competitive government, people take leaders as given, and they select jurisdictions.

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Creative Capitalism on Profit-Maximizing Governments, Mobility and Taxes

August 10, 2008 by

 Arnold Kling writes about profit-maximizing governments on Creative Capitalism:

 

Assume that the leader of a territory, whether the United States or Zimbabwe, is elected by shareholders, each of whom may or may not be a resident of the territory.  In each territory, the leader would control fiscal policy, monetary policy, and regulations.  She could set tax rates at whatever level she liked.  Some of the tax revenues would be used to fund internal investments.  However, the remainder would be disbursed as dividends to shareholders. 

Shareholders would be looking to maximize their returns.  If the leader engages in arbitrary confiscation, she may be able to pay a nice short-term dividend.  However, such a policy will lower the society’s wealth and reduce future dividends.  Shareholders would prefer a more farsighted policy.  A leader who protects property rights and invests in public goods probably will generate a higher share price.

A poorly-run country, such as Zimbabwe, probably would be taken over by investors seeking to profit from a turnaround.  These investors would buy up shares and install new management.

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